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Heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state; legal and illegal iconoclasm
In this article we map heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. We outline 
the historic and contemporary political context in Myanmar explaining the 
background of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic group and addressing the contribution of 
religion and political change to anti-Rohingya discrimination and violence in 
Myanmar. We trace patterns of heritage destruction as legal and/or illegal iconoclasm 
and specify the key elements of heritage destruction in Rakhine state. Our analysis 
focusses on the use of heritage destruction in Rakhine state as a tool of genocide, and 
we suggest that heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state ought to be 
understood as part the authorities’ policies of genocide against the Rohingya. We 
conclude the article with a call for UNESCO to act to extend its Unite4Heritage 
campaign to include the destruction of heritage by state actors.
Key words
Heritage destruction, Myanmar, Rohingya, Genocide, UNESCO, iconoclasm
Introduction
In recent years, the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage, particularly in conflict 
contexts, has become increasingly visible. Heritage destruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, 
and Syria drew the attention of the world’s media, caused public outcry, and in one instance 
led to a successful International Criminal Court prosecution (Burke 2016; González 
Zarandona, Albarrán-Torres and Isakhan 2018; Kraak 2018; Moffett 2017; UN News 2017a). 
Although the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage in Myanmar has been less visible 
internationally, throughout the 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis there were numerous 
documented examples of cultural heritage destruction both by the Myanmar authorities and 
by ordinary residents of Myanmar. The 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis drew world attention to 
the circumstances of this persecuted Muslim ethnic minority and to the nature of the military 
crackdown that caused around 700,000 Rohingya to flee their homes in Rakhine state for 
Bangladesh (OCHA 2018; UN News 2017b; UNHCR 2018). 
During 2017, Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, partially or totally razed almost 
300 Rohingya villages and destroyed numerous mosques in northern Rakhine state (Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) 2017a, 2017b, 2018). The Myanmar authorities have subsequently 
remodelled large parts of northern Rakhine state which has included constructing at least one 
military base on lands previously occupied by the Rohingya (Amnesty International (AI) 
2018a, 2018b; Associated Press 2018; Child 2018). Largescale destruction of cultural 
heritage in Rakhine state did not begin in 2017. During 2012, conflict between Buddhists and 
Muslims caused the destruction of entire neighbourhoods around the state capital, Sittwe, 
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displacing more than 140,000 people, overwhelmingly Muslims, in Rakhine state (see Map; 
HRW 2012; Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2013). 
In this article we map heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state from the time of this 
2012 violence to the present. We also outline historic heritage destruction in Myanmar, 
before considering the role of religion and recent political change in violence in 
contemporary Myanmar. We next trace patters of heritage destruction as legal and/or illegal 
iconoclasm specifying the key elements of heritage destruction in Rakhine state. Our analysis 
focusses on the use of heritage destruction in Rakhine state as a tool of genocide, and we 
suggest that heritage destruction in Rakhine state ought to be understood as part the 
authorities’ policies of genocide against the Rohingya. We conclude the article with a call for 
UNESCO to act to extend its Unite4Heritage campaign to include the destruction of heritage 
by state actors. 
We characterise heritage destruction by ordinary residents, mobs or violent extremist groups 
as “iconoclasm from below” or illegal iconoclasm. This is iconoclasm which may be deemed 
illegal by the government. This type of deliberate cultural heritage destruction has been the 
focus of UNESCO’s “Unite4Heritage” campaign which urges state actors to highlight and 
tackle cultural heritage destruction by violent extremist groups (UNESCO 2018). However, 
much of the deliberate cultural heritage destruction in Rakhine state, including most 
destruction of mosques, is perpetrated by state actors and is appropriately characterised as 
“iconoclasm from above” or legal iconoclasm – the destruction of material culture that is 
perpetrated by the state and therefore perceived as legitimate within that state’s legal 
framework. Characterising the destruction of cultural heritage in this manner allows for a 
nuanced account of the recent landscape of heritage destruction in Rakhine state. This leads 
us to argue in this article that UNESCO’s focus on preventing the deliberate destruction of 
cultural heritage is too heavily focused on preventing iconoclasm from below and does not 
adequately seek to prevent iconoclasm from above. 
Myanmar: historic and contemporary political context 
Myanmar, often still known as Burma,1 is an overwhelmingly Buddhist Southeast Asian 
nation located on the Bay of Bengal. Bordered by Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and 
Thailand, its controversial 2014 census – the first in three decades – reported a national 
population of around 50 million people (Myanmar Information Management Unit, 2014). 
However, enumerators were prevented from collecting data from more than one million 
people who wished their ethnicity to be recorded as “Rohingya”, an ethnic identity the 
authorities do not acknowledge. Living mostly in Rakhine state, close to Myanmar’s westerly 
border with Bangladesh, the Rohingya are a persecuted Muslim group and are denied 
citizenship rights by Myanmar’s Buddhist dominated authorities (AI, 2017a; HRW, 2012; 
Lee, 2014). By 2018 the Rohingya represent one of the world’s largest stateless groups and 
with this statelessness has come waves of destruction of Rohingya heritage (Ibrahim, 2018), 
as has been the case in other similar contexts (De Cesari 2010; Saunders 2008).
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Nationwide, 87.9% of Myanmar’s residents are Buddhist and only 4.3% Muslims, but in 
Rakhine state the Muslim population is greater than 35% (Department of Population 2015). 
The most populous ethnic group in Myanmar is the “Bamar” (also known as “Burman”). This 
mostly Buddhist group comprises close to three-quarters of Myanmar’s population and has 
dominated the institutions of Myanmar since the country gained independence from Britain in 
1948. The dominant ethnicity in Rakhine state is a Buddhist group known as the “Rakhine” 
who account for a little under 2 million of Rakhine state’s around 3.2 million people 
(Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2015). The Rakhine are acknowledged as citizens of 
Myanmar but are independent minded and harbour resentments towards the central 
authorities whom they consider do not adequately prioritise ethnic Rakhine concerns, 
although in recent years the Rakhine have had some success communicating their priorities 
onto Myanmar’s national political stage (International Crisis Group 2014). The Arakan 
National Party (ANP), a nationalist and pro-Rakhine group is the largest block in the Rakhine 
state parliament and the third largest party in Myanmar’s national parliament (International 
Crisis Group 2015). In recent times, the ANP has found common ground with Bamar and 
Buddhist nationalists, particularly in their opposition to improved rights for Muslim groups in 
Myanmar (Mathieson 2016; Su-Ann Oh 2016).
The area today known as Rakhine state had been an independent kingdom (known as 
Arakan), with a Buddhist ethnic Rakhine majority but with a sizeable and well-integrated 
Muslim minority when it was invaded by the Burmese in 1784. This was less than four 
decades before the Burmese subsequently lost this territory to the British during the 1820s. 
Burma’s Konbaung dynasty, which ruled Burma from the early 1750s was militarily 
aggressive and claimed territory in areas that are today parts of Bangladesh, India, Laos, and 
Thailand (Hall 1950). Conflict with the British who had relatively recently gained control of 
territory adjacent to Arakan and subsequent defeat in the first of the three Anglo-Burmese 
Wars saw Burma’s Arakan territory ceded to the British (Treaty of Yandabo 1826). Military 
defeat ended Burmese sovereignty in 1886 and Burma became a province of British India, 
ruled from Calcutta and later New Delhi (Hall 1950; Myint-U 2007; Phayre 1883). The 
ultimate humiliation for many Burmese Buddhists at this time came when the British, during 
December 1885, exiled the last Burmese king, Thibaw, to India (Christian 1944).
These military and political reversals significantly dented Burmese pride, leaving many 
among the country’s Buddhist population resentful of the British, and over time, of those 
perceived to have benefited by British colonial rule. These resentments were fuelled by 
perceptions, often valid, that the British privileged those of Indian origin, frequently Muslims 
and with darker skin than many Buddhist Burmese and Rakhine, for plum roles within the 
colonial administration (Charney 2009; Steinberg 2010; Taylor 2009). The British imported 
large numbers of administrators from the sub-continent and encouraged the inward migration 
of low-income labourers into the province of Burma which was considered underpopulated 
for Britain’s commercial purposes. Indian moneylenders arrived too and through loan 
defaults would become major landowners in colonial Burma (Taylor 2009; Turnell and 
Vicary 2008; Steinberg 2010).
This colonial-era migration contributed to attitudes that persist in contemporary times; 
namely, that migrants flooded into colonial Burma from the sub-continent and then gained an 
Page 4 of 31
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjhs





























































For Peer Review Only
economic advantage over the country’s mostly Buddhist indigenous population. These 
attitudes greatly contribute to contemporary ethnic and religious tensions, as does the 
perception among many Myanmar Buddhists that Rakhine state Muslims, by supporting the 
British rather than the Japanese during the Second World War, demonstrated a disloyalty to 
Burmese aspirations for independence (Charney 2009; International Crisis Group 2013, 2014; 
Steinberg 2010). Today, colonial era migration to Burma, particularly to Arakan, is a 
commonly raised grievance by Myanmar’s Buddhist nationalists who suggest the ancestors of 
the contemporary Rohingya were colonial-era imports who ought not to be considered a 
group indigenous to Burma and thus not entitled to collective rights to citizenship as other 
ethnic groups are in Myanmar (Freeman 2017; Peck 2017).
The Burmese independence movement led by Aung San, father of Myanmar’s current de-
facto civilian leader, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, auspiced a Japanese 
occupation during the Second World War to push out the British. A change of heart and of 
sides by Aung San’s Burmese forces, and Japanese wartime defeat saw the return of the 
British to power in Burma and the grant of independence in 1948. Independent Burma was 
democratic only for a brief period that ended with a military coup in 1962. The subsequent 
military-led governments crushed political opposition, sealed the country from the outside 
world, oversaw an economic collapse, continual conflict between the military and dozens of 
ethnic armed groups, and enforced one of the world’s most restrictive media environments. 
Military-led governments remained in power until a quasi-civilian administration led by 
former general Thein Sein won the stage-managed 2010 general election. The subsequent 
election in 2015, saw the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) party led by 
Aung San Suu Kyi win a substantial majority of elected constituencies. An NLD 
administration took political power in 2016, with Aung San Suu Kyi becoming State 
Counsellor – a Prime Ministerial styled role created to overcome a constitutional hurdle 
barring her from the Presidency because of her marriage to a foreigner and her children’s 
foreign citizenships.
Religion, anti-Rohingya discrimination and violence in Myanmar
In a Myanmar where ethnicity and religion have the potential to be major political fault lines, 
greatly improved access to communication technology and political freedoms, allowed by the 
country’s quasi-civilian governments, meant Myanmar’s residents could receive and 
disseminate opinions about political and social issues, including issues of ethnicity and 
religion, with the click of a button. Myanmar’s education system has been poorly funded for 
decades, and internet and media literacy are low (Baker 2016; UNESCO and IMS 2016). 
Journalists working in Myanmar often report that people accept news posted to Facebook as 
being as reliable as news sourced from mainstream media sources (Douek 2018). Among the 
most active political users of social media in Myanmar are extreme nationalist groups like the 
monk-led Ma Ba Tha (Association for the Protection of Race and Religion), and figures like 
the activist monk Ashin Wirathu, dubbed the “Buddhist Bin Laden”, who argue Myanmar’s 
national interest is served by the protection of the special place of the Buddhist religion that is 
threatened by other religions, especially Islam. Wirathu, in a widely publicised interview with 
Time magazine, claimed that: “[Muslims] are breeding so fast, and they are stealing our 
Page 5 of 31
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjhs





























































For Peer Review Only
women, raping them…They would like to occupy our country, but I won’t let them. We must 
keep Myanmar Buddhist” (Beech 2013). Wirathu is also reported to have described 90% of 
Muslims in Myanmar as, “radical, bad people” (Beech 2013). Wirathu and other Buddhist 
nationalists tap into dissatisfaction at immigration from the sub-continent during the British 
colonial period, beliefs that many Muslims did not adequately support the Burmese 
independence movement, and perceptions that Myanmar’s Buddhist character is threatened 
by Islam, to call for restrictions on the rights of Muslims in Myanmar.
Despite less than 5% of Myanmar’s residents being Muslim, Wirathu and other nationalists 
argue Myanmar’s Buddhist religion is at an existential threat from the encroachment of Islam. 
They point to former Buddhist countries that are now majority-Muslim like Afghanistan, 
Indonesia and Malaysia to suggest that unless local Islam is held in check, Myanmar and its 
Buddhist character could follow a similar path. By doing so, they elevate anti-Islam attitudes 
and actions to a nationalist’s moral duty. In this context, with Myanmar’s Buddhist religion 
considered by many to be under siege from Islam, nationalists have successfully used 
Myanmar’s new media and political freedoms to marginalise Muslims, particularly the 
Rohingya Muslim minority (Lee 2018). This marginalisation has included successfully 
pursuing the enactment of the “Protection of Race and Religion” laws, which limit the rights 
of ethnic and religious minorities and women, and by convincing both the pro-military Union 
Solidarity and Development Party and Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition NLD to field no 
Muslim candidates at the 2015 general election. As a result, there are no Muslim 
representatives in Myanmar’s parliament, and in Rakhine state, the Rohingya who were 
disenfranchised prior to the 2015 polls, often live in areas represented by Buddhist nationalist 
politicians.
The Rohingya have been victims of official discrimination in Myanmar for decades which 
has been documented by human rights groups including AI (1992, 1997, 2004, 2016, 2017a), 
HRW (1996, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2013), Physicians for Human Rights (2013, 2016), and 
Refugees International (2014). A 2015 academic study by the International State Crime 
Initiative concluded the Rohingya were victims of genocide, having found
ample evidence that the Rohingya have been subjected to systematic and widespread 
violations of human rights, including killings, torture, rape and arbitrary detention; 
destruction of their homes and villages; land confiscation; forced labour; denial of 
citizenship; denial of the right to identify themselves as Rohingya; denial of access to 
healthcare, education and employment; restrictions on freedom of movement, and 
State-sanctioned campaigns of religious hatred (Green, MacManus and de la Cour 
Venning 2015, 15).
Periodically, this discrimination manifests violently, and actions by Myanmar’s military 
contributed to a series of large-scale forced migrations of Rohingya to Bangladesh during the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s (AI 1992; HRW 2000; Ware and Laoutides 2018). In recent years, 
two periods of violence stand out as significant inflection points: the 2012 Rakhine state 
violence between Buddhists and Muslims—characterised by the authorities as communal 
conflict—and the military’s 2017 “clearance operation” (UN Human Rights Council 2018; 
UN News 2017b).
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During 2012, violence between Buddhists and Muslims left almost 200 dead and displaced 
around 140,000 people, the overwhelming majority of whom were Rohingya Muslims 
(International Crisis Group 2013). Despite rising ethnic tensions in Rakhine state, Buddhists 
and Muslims told HRW that the, “authorities provided no protection and did not appear to 
have taken any special measures to pre-empt the violence” (HRW 2012). This violent episode 
resulted in the razing of entire Muslim-majority areas of Sittwe, leading to the large-scale 
displacement of Rohingya Muslim residents. During the violence, Sittwe’s most prominent 
Muslim site, the oldest mosque in Sittwe, the Jama Mosque, was ransacked by a Buddhist 
mob. The authorities’ eventual response to the violence was to separate Buddhist and Muslim 
populations but the Muslim community bore the brunt of this policy with more than 120,000 
of those originally displaced during 2012 remaining confined in internally displaced person 
(IDP) camps or locked down in their neighbourhoods more than seven years later (UN News 
2019; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2017). Their former 
communities, their homes having been turned to ash, were mostly not actively remodelled but 
instead left so that nature reclaimed this land with foliage. By 2019, much of these areas 
resembles scrub land or disused agricultural land – most traces of these areas as former 
Rohingya communities have been erased. Seven years after it was desecrated, the Jama 
Mosque remains closed and despite its location on Sittwe’s main thoroughfare, access is 
blocked by an armed military guard who also actively prevent photography of the site.
Despite the appalling discrimination suffered by the Rohingya, mainstream Rohingya 
political opinion in recent decades has rejected a strategy of political violence. However, by 
late 2016 this attitude appeared to be changing for some Rohingya living in northern Rakhine 
state with the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group 
and its claims to represent the interests of the Rohingya community (International Crisis 
Group 2016; Lee 2017). ARSA’s August 2017 attacks on security posts in northern Rakhine 
state, precipitated a brutal crackdown by the Tatmadaw on the Rohingya. Myanmar’s military 
actions in northern Rakhine state led to the largest displacement of civilians in the region 
since the end of World War II. During a ten weeks’ period from late August 2017 more than 
600,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar for Bangladesh. This crackdown was described by United 
Nation’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein as an “example of 
ethnic cleansing” (UN News 2017b). The military’s “clearance operation” was characterised 
by extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, sexual violence, and the razing of hundreds of 
villages, including the destruction of mosques.
Within this violent environment, and as part of the clearance operation that the Tatmadaw 
performed in northern Rakhine state Rohingya communities during 2017, a particular type of 
destruction of culturally significant sites emerged. Witnesses of the violence have spoken 
about how entire villages were burned by the military, and HRW used satellite images to 
confirm the widespread destruction of Rohingya villages by fire (HRW, 2017b). AI (2018c) 
described this as a land grab by the military who constructed bases on the sites of razed 
Rohingya villages. The scale of the destruction of Rohingya villages and of the forced 
migration that accompanied it drew widespread international condemnation (Al Jazeera 
2017a; The Economist 2017). While numerous Rohingya arrivals at refugee camps in 
Bangladesh described how the military set fire to Rohingya homes, including by using 
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military helicopters, and machines akin to flamethrowers, blame for this destruction was 
contested. Myanmar’s military, which has rejected accusations of wrongdoing during the 
2017 “clearance operation” claims Rohingya villagers set fire to their own homes to gain 
international sympathy (Wa Lone 2017). The military’s claim was undermined during a 
media tour of Rakhine state when journalists witnessed an apparent staged burning by 
residents pretending to be Rohingya and saw villages in military controlled areas burning 
days after the Rohingya residents fled (BBC 2017a; Head 2017). As witnessed in other cases, 
the destruction of material culture and significant sites does often draw the attention of the 
international media, generating sympathy towards the minority which suffers the trauma 
(Isakhan, González Zarandona and Jamal 2019). Likewise, the destruction of significant sites 
is a tool that has been used by perpetrators as an extension of the genocidal campaign they 
exercise against a particular group, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia, where entire 
villages including their mosques where razed (Walasek 2015), to erase evidence of previous 
occupation by Muslims and thus enable the rewriting of history.
Violence and heritage destruction
The destruction of material cultur  that belongs to a social group for religious and/or political 
motivations has been used as a tool since Antiquity by countless armies and empires to 
demonstrate power over conquered people. This practice has often been used as part of a 
strategy to destroy groups’ identities, histories and memories, their past and property. Clay 
(2012, 181) explains this by asserting: “Th  breaching of representational objects’ physical 
integrity continues to be a means by which diverse groups and individuals represent and 
imagine contested power relations between a state, its citizens and wider communities”. The 
study, analysis and interpretation of this phenomenon has taken a turn in the last two decades 
thanks to a series of studies that have established that many acts of physical violence against 
people are usually accompanied by the destruction of heritage with different consequences 
and motivations (Bevan 2006; Mitchell 2015; Walasek 2015). A useful case study is the 
destruction of heritage in the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, including 
the destruction of mosques and significant cultural sites such as the National and University 
Library in Sarajevo in 1992, that demonstrated an explicit link between the destruction of 
heritage and the genocide that was perpetrated on the ground. Thus, the acts of heritage 
destruction were not considered isolated events but acts of violence that sought to erase the 
past embedded in archives, buildings, and traditions, deeply affecting the targeted group’s 
identity and memories. 
Feierstein (2014, 2015) explains that erasing the past is often a tactic used by perpetrators of 
genocide to reorient societies for the future. The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage 
often involves the systematic targeting of cultural property to erase the traces left by a 
cultural group and claim the group has never existed or inhabited that territory, thus allowing 
history to be rewritten through the creation of new symbols – the destruction of an image 
always entails the creation of a new one (Latour 2002). The motivation to destroy the 
material culture arises from a mandate that seeks to delimit the territory that the group 
inhabits (Mitchell 2015). By destroying the cultural features that are considered to make the 
territory unique (these characteristics might include buildings of religious or political 
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significance, images and traditions), the perpetrators claim the territory for themselves. The 
destruction of cultural heritage symbolizes, by proxy, the destruction of the group to which 
the targeted material culture belongs. Research on this topic has framed the destruction of 
certain sites and places as part of the objective of erasing and destroying not only the past but 
also the memories associated to those sites and places (Bevan 2006). The memories attached 
to certain sites can be of a historical or personal nature. By erasing the site and the features in 
it, the memories associated with the place are also obliterated.
Beyond the work of these scholars that have established the links of heritage destruction with 
the destruction of the past and memories, the concepts of iconoclasm (destruction of images 
for political and religious reasons), defacement (destruction of human or facial characteristics 
in images) and vandalism (thoughtless and wanton destruction of property) are also often 
employed by scholars to explain why and how a destruction of cultural heritage occured and 
the motivations behind it (Freedberg 1989; Mitchell 2015; Taussig 1999). For example, 
destruction of heritage in Iraq and Syria has been characterized as iconoclasm (Isakhan and 
González Zarandona, 2018) due to theological arguments that the so-called Islamic State (IS) 
put forward in their digital mediated propaganda through social media to justify the 
destruction of archaeological artefacts (González Zarandona et al. 2018). A key argument 
present in the literature is that the act of destruction is not meaningless, but instead it has a 
meaning in itself and occurs in the first place due to the symbolic power that the object 
exudes or possesses – this is a form of communication with a specific message. As Gamboni 
claimed (1997, 22), iconoclasms “must be considered as means of communication in their 
own right, even if the ‘material’ they make use of is – or was – itself a tool of expression or 
communication”. However, heritage destruction is only meaningful as far as the message 
delivered resonates within the targeted group and other stakeholders and produces a reaction. 
An attack upon a Shia mosque, for example, will not have the same resonance in a Christian 
community as in the Shia community where the attack took place. In fact, as Isakhan (2015, 
274) has demonstrated, the targeting of a culturally significant site may trigger violent acts 
against people perceived to be the perpetrators, in retaliation for the attack on the heritage 
site, thus unleashing catastrophic consequences as was the case in Iraq, when the Shia Al-
Askari mosque was targeted by Al-Qaeda in 2006.
During the 21st century, the Taliban’s 2001 destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas to avoid 
idolatry amongst the Afghan population, inscribed the destruction of heritage as part of the 
deliberate intent to destroy religious images. The notion of iconoclasm was mainly adopted to 
characterize the destruction of these statues, but there was also emphasis on the primitive and 
barbaric nature of the Taliban regime – a claim that resurfaced during 2015 when IS released 
their infamous video shot at Mosul Museum. However, in defining the destruction of the 
Bamiyan statues, an array of scholars including Falser (2011), Flood (2002), and Gamboni 
(2001) were successful in framing the destruction as an attack not to the idol of Buddha, but 
instead upon heritage, as exercised by international bodies, such as UNESCO, that oversee 
the safekeeping, preservation and conservation of cultural heritage. The fact that this 
infamous example was characterized as an iconoclasm, in the form of heritage destruction, 
reflects the emergence of this phenomenon in recent decades as a violent act that fuses 
political and religious motives and at the same time attacks where it most hurts. In this case, 
Western values attached to conservation and cultural heritage issues. The Buddhas of 
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Bamiyan destruction highlights how the task of defining heritage destruction is not always 
straightforward and depends on the context of the destruction.
Patterns of heritage destruction in Rakhine state
Scholars working on the destruction of religious images during the Reformation in Europe 
including Eire (1989) and Christin (1991) claim there are two types of iconoclasm, based on 
who is the perpetrator. We argue that the destruction of heritage in Myanmar’s Rakhine state 
in recent times can be characterized using a similar framework. In adapting the framework 
that Eire, and Christin used to explain some of the consequences of Reformation in Europe to 
the destruction of Rohingya heritage in Myanmar we point to Freedberg’s (2018) work, 
which demonstrates that the resonance of past acts of iconoclasm is astoundingly high in 
present acts. He successfully demonstrates how, for example, some of the destructions are 
actually replicated (perhaps unconsciously), thus drawing a line from the past to more recent 
moments of iconoclasm. Freedberg shows the ways in which some statues in Europe during 
the Reformation were defaced and humiliated – to dispossess them of their power – and how 
similar actions have been enacted in more recent times, with statues of Saddam Hussein 
targeted after his fall and statues of the Shah of Iran similarly treated. Likewise, adapting a 
framework that satisfactorily explains the form that the destruction of religious imagery took 
in Europe suits the Myanmar case, not because we believe that the political instability that 
occurs in Myanmar is identical to that of Northern Europe, but because the destruction of 
heritage occurs in a similar fashion to these historic European examples.
Accordingly, iconoclasms that are sponsored and encouraged by a state are considered as 
iconoclasm from above, or legal iconoclasm. That is, the state can use iconoclasm as a tool to 
obliterate certain ideologies and promote others, including communities’ rituals that the State 
may estimate “traditional, superstitious, and idolatrous” (Noyes 2016, 1). By erasing these 
communities and their material culture, iconoclasm becomes an instrument of power used by 
the state to re-assert its authority. As such, the state validates the destruction as it appears that 
it is operating within the law. Eire (1989, 154) identified this type of iconoclasm as “that 
which is effected with government approval (though not necessarily under its direction).” 
Freedberg (2018) has extensively documented how, for example, the revolt in the 
Netherlands, the Beeldenstorm, during the sixteenth century that caused the destruction of 
statues and images was encouraged, in some instances, by the same local authorities. 
Likewise, since the military coup of 1962, Burma/Myanmar’s ethnic Bamar-dominated 
central authorities have regularly been accused of undertaking a nationwide campaign of 
Burmanisation with the aim of homogenising the country’s ethnic, religious and cultural 
minorities into a hegemonic Bamar state (Berlie 2008; Holmes 1967; Rogers 2013). A 
frequently referenced element of this campaign has been the destruction of non-Buddhist 
religious icons and structures, and often their replacement with Buddhist icons, particularly in 
areas with higher numbers of non-Buddhist residents like Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Rakhine 
states (Coconuts Yangon 2018; Sithu Aung Myint 2016; US Department of State 2001, 
2017).
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An alternate type of iconoclasm is the destruction perpetrated by individuals or by mobs 
which can be considered illegal and from below. These destructions are considered illegal 
because they are not allowed by the state and break the law. Removing or destroying cultural 
property regarded by the state as part of their heritage is also deemed illegal. The main 
difference between these two types of iconoclasm is that the perpetrator either fulfils the law 
or not. In some cases, one may ensue the other. For example, in 2003, the army of the USA 
performed a staged iconoclasm by toppling the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad’s 
Firdos Square to signal the end of Hussein’s regime. The toppling of the statue, albeit an 
orchestrated performance by the USA military, motivated people to start attacking and hitting 
the statue once it was on the ground. In this case, we can see both iconoclasms being 
performed concurrently. However, in some cases it is only possible to discern one type of 
iconoclasm and at another times it can be difficult to draw a line to show when one finishes 
and the other starts. According to Warnke, while iconoclasm from above can be celebrated as 
a great moment in history precisely because it erases the old symbols and prepares the way 
for the new symbols to come, iconoclasm from below is often considered “blind vandalism” 
(cited by Gamboni 1997, 23). Groys (2002) elaborates on this point, calling for careful 
consideration of who wins and who loses in this war of symbols, because the victors may lose 
the battle in the end and their symbols be removed in the future.
Tackling such a sensitive phenomenon can be challenging given the context and 
circumstances specific to Myanmar. Studying the destruction of cultural heritage in the 
context of Myanmar’s Rakhine state should therefore not be seen as a sideline from important 
humanitarian considerations: the welfare of more than one million Rohingya displaced from 
Myanmar and forced to live as refugees in Bangladesh. Studying the destruction of heritage 
as part of the genocidal campaign orchestrated by the Myanmar state can show the extent to 
which the recent destruction and remodelling of parts of northern Rakhine state forms part of 
a long-term campaign by Myanmar’s authorities against the Rohingya.
Key instances of heritage destruction in Rakhine state
Both key instances of destruction we consider – associated with Rakhine state’s 2012 
violence, and the Myanmar military’s 2017 “clearance operation” in northern Rakhine state – 
involves instances of destruction from above and below. However, in each case the 
destruction is mostly of one type. The destruction undertaken during the 2012 violence we 
characterise as mostly iconoclasm from below, while the destruction undertaken during the 
Myanmar military’s 2017 “clearance operation” we characterise it as mostly involving 
destruction from above.
The 2012 violence involved the active participation of both ethnic Rakhine Buddhist and 
Rohingya Muslim communities and has been often characterised as communal conflict. This 
violence resulted in the deaths of around 200 people and displaced more than 140,000 people 
(International Crisis Group 2013). Most of those killed and the overwhelming majority of 
those displaced were Muslims from the Rohingya community, and this occurred in a context 
of decades of official discrimination against the Rohingya. President Thein Sein’s 
announcement that the “only solution” was to remove the Rohingya to other countries added 
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credibility to Rohingya accusations that anti-Muslim violence formed part of an official 
Myanmar strategy (HRW 2012, 19; Mizzima News 2012). There were reports of security 
forces committing abuses, including arbitrary arrests and unlawfully using force against 
Rohingya communities, and of security forces working in concert with ethnic Rakhine mobs 
to target Rohingya communities (AI 2012; BBC 2012; HRW 2012). Witnesses describe 
Myanmar’s security forces disarming Muslim communities before retreating and not 
intervening while armed Buddhist mobs attacked the defenceless Muslims (HRW 2012; 
Wade 2017). 
The 2012 violence occurred following weeks of rising sectarian tensions. Yet despite this, 
both Buddhist and Muslim communities reported Myanmar’s authorities as providing little or 
no protection and having seemingly not made preparations to prevent conflict (HRW 2012; 
Wade 2017). The proximate sparks for widespread violence in Rakhine state were the rape 
and murder of a young Buddhist woman by three Muslim men, and the retaliatory murders of 
ten Muslims and one Buddhist mistaken as Muslim who were dragged from a Yangon bound 
bus by a Rakhine Buddhist mob (Al Jazeera 2012; HRW 2012). HRW (2012, 18) described 
how, during June 2012
Arakan [Rakhine] and Rohingya mobs attacked homes, shops, and houses of worship. 
Witnesses described mobs from both populations storming neighbourhoods, pillaging 
and setting fire to homes and other buildings, and beating those they found with crude 
weapons, such as swords, bamboo sticks, metal bars, and poles.
At least five thousand buildings, overwhelmingly homes in Muslim areas of Rakhine state’s 
capital Sittwe like the Nasi Quarter were razed to the ground (HRW, 2013). This 2012 
violence involved not only the destruction of entire Muslim neighbourhoods of Sittwe 
displacing tens of thousands, but also involved symbolic acts of destruction like the 
ransacking of the historic Jama Mosque, a previously prominent feature of Sittwe’s main 
commercial street. Built in the mid-nineteenth century, in Arabesque-style, Jama Mosque’s 
location close to the Rakhine State Parliament and other official buildings like the Rakhine 
State Museum made it a key representation of the long-term and legitimate presence of 
Muslims in Rakhine state. Its ransacking represented a symbolic rejection of Rakhine state’s 
Islamic history. Since its sacking, Jama Mosque has been closed and is guarded by armed 
government security who prevent all access and routinely prevent photography, even by 
tourists, thus exercising a form of iconoclasm by prohibiting the production of images.
Myanmar’s authorities treated the violence as a communal dispute between Buddhist and 
Muslim communities (Cheesman 2017). The Myanmar authorities’ strategy to prevent further 
outbreaks of violence was to separate both communities, but the burden of this policy fell 
overwhelmingly on the Rohingya Muslims who found their rights further restricted and were 
confined to IDP camps or locked down in their neighbourhoods or villages. More than seven 
years later, 120,000 of those Rohingya originally confined to IDP camps during 2012 
continue to be prevented from leaving (UN News 2019; UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 2017). Many thousands of those Muslims who lost their homes to fire 
were confined to IDP camps on the outskirts of Sittwe, while others were locked down in 
their neighbourhoods. Mosques that were damaged during the violence have remained closed 
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since 2012. While much of this violence is appropriately characterised as destruction from 
below and thus illegal destruction, the authorities’ subsequent actions indicate official 
approval of its outcomes. 
Restricting a minorities’ access to sites of worship may not only be considered an iconoclasm 
from above, but it also contributes to create an ambience of tension between Buddhists and 
Muslims who are sharing the same space. As Eire (1986) discusses, it is the friction of two 
groups co-existing within the same space that motivates the destruction of the Other’s 
heritage in an attempt to control the territory and erase the signs of occupation. Moreover, 
strategies that restrict the access to and enjoyment of cultural heritage have an impact on its 
conservation, not only affecting its integrity but also on the well-being and rights of the 
people associated with that particular cultural heritage, as noted by the UN Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Karima Bennoune (United Nations Human Rights 
2017). By accessing cultural heritage, the identity of the people associated with that heritage 
is not only asserted but it is also exerted as a right. Without this interaction, the process of 
heritage simply cannot exist. In contrast, limiting the access “to and enjoyment of cultural 
heritage” is a tool to “exert political or social pressure” (Shaheed 2011, 5), thus the 
destruction of cultural heritage “with discriminatory intent against a cultural community can 
be charged as a crime against humanity”, as well as “evidence of an intent to destroy a group 
within the meaning of the Genocide Convention” (Shaheed 2011, 7). The evidence so far 
collected in Myanmar certainly speaks about the Myanmar military’s 2017 violence in 
Rakhine state as a tool of genocide.
Despite being prompted by attacks on security posts by a newly emerged Rohingya militant 
group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the violence in northern Rakhine state 
during 2017 was overwhelmingly undertaken by Myanmar’s military and was more 
comprehensive in its destruction than that of 2012. Around 300 Rohingya villages were 
partially or totally razed during a campaign the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein described as, “A textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (HRW 2017b; 
UN News 2017b). HRW (2017a) considered the military’s actions as amounting to, “crimes 
against humanity”, and AI (2017b) characterised the situation as a “human rights and 
humanitarian catastrophe”. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled their homes and villages 
in terror, and by year’s end there were 650,000 more Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Al 
Jazeera 2017b; BBC 2017b; Inter Sector Coordination Group 2017). The immediate spark for 
this violence was attacks on security posts by ARSA militants. The Tatmadaw’s response, 
was a “clearance operation” claimed as a search for ARSA militants that employed brutal 
tactics and made little distinction between civilians and potential militants. In contrast to the 
violence of 2012, which has often been characterised as inter-communal and which we 
describe as overwhelmingly involving iconoclasm from below, the violence of 2017 involved 
destruction undertaken by the authorities. 
Rohingya refugees arriving in Bangladesh routinely described how Myanmar’s military came 
to their villages, forced out the population using violence, and then burned villages in their 
entirety. This destruction was documented by media, humanitarian groups, and by UN 
Human Rights Council (2018, 9) investigators who used satellite images and collected first-
hand accounts to report
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systematic, deliberate and targeted destruction, mainly by fire, of Rohingya-populated 
areas across the three townships. At least 392 villages (40 per cent of all settlements 
in northern Rakhine) were partially or totally destroyed, encompassing at least 37,700 
individual structures. Approximately 80 per cent were burned in the initial three 
weeks of the operations, a significant portion of which after the Government’s official 
end date of the “clearance operations”. More than 70 per cent of the villages 
destroyed were in Maungdaw, where the majority of Rohingya lived. Most destroyed 
structures were homes. Schools, marketplaces and mosques were also burned. 
Rohingya-populated areas were specifically targeted, with adjacent or nearby Rakhine 
settlements left unscathed.
Myanmar’s authorities claimed Rohingya burned their own homes to gain international 
sympathy (Associated Press 2017; Head 2017; Ratcliffe 2017). The credibility of this claim 
was seriously undermined when international media, during an official tour of northern 
Rakhine state, encountered ethnic Rakhine men setting fire to Rohingya homes in an area that 
had been under the control of the Myanmar military for weeks (Head 2017). Further 
undermining the claims of Myanmar’s military is satellite imagery showing how Rohingya 
villages were burned while adjacent Buddhist homes remain untouched by fire (Whiteside 
2017). After Rohingya villages were depopulated and razed to the ground, many Rohingya 
villages were quickly remodelled by Myanmar’s authorities, erasing evidence of Rohingya 
connections with those places (Goldberg 2018; Miller 2018). In late 2017, HRW published 
satellite images showing that the Myanmar authorities had used heavy machinery to clear all 
structures and vegetation from more than 50 villages, while AI documented the building of 
roads and structures including at least one military base over burned Rohingya villages and 
land (AI 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; Associated Press 2018; Child 2018; HRW 2017b, 2018).
Discussion
These examples of destruction include both iconoclasm from above and iconoclasm from 
below. Moreover, the destruction taking place in Myanmar described here, ought to be 
considered in the context of ongoing policies of genocide targeting the country’s Rohingya 
ethnic minority and described by the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar (UN Human Rights Council 2018). Together, the destruction of 
villages, the targeting of culturally significant sites such as mosques, restricting access to 
them, and erasing evidence of Rohingya connections with these sites are strong indications 
that the state of Myanmar is pursuing a genocide against the group. According to the 
Framework of analysis for atrocity crimes: a tool for prevention developed in 2014 by the 
Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, the destruction of culturally and 
religious significant places is a significant indicator to prevent further crimes that put in risk 
the existence of groups, and assess the risk of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (United Nations 2014). Indeed, as we showed above, the destruction of heritage is 
in many cases a sign that a genocide is taking place, or it will take place. When claiming 
genocide, one of the signs that precedes it is often the targeting and destruction of monuments 
and sacred spaces. Throughout history this type of destruction has been witnessed and it was 
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listed by Raphael Lemkin as one of the eight techniques of genocide, with the deliberate 
intent to destroy a group in whole or in part (Lemkin 1944). Lemkin’s point is echoed too by 
Feierstein (2014, 2015) who suggests a final step in the genocide process is the employment 
of strategies to erase the collective memory of the victim group. Moses too has argued (2010, 
34), the destruction of cultural symbols and heritage is always ahead of the physical and 
biological genocide. Examples such as the destruction of Armenian churches and Yezidi 
mausoleums in Iraq and Syria by IS are among recent examples (Isakhan et al 2019). 
However, in the case of Myanmar, official attacks on the Rohingya were not preceded by the 
destruction of their mosques, but happened at the same time, perhaps in an effort to accelerate 
the deliberate intent to destroy the group as a whole. The speed in which the process of 
destruction took place in Myanmar perhaps explains why the international community was, at 
first, slow to condemn the genocide. Accustomed to seeing signs of destruction of cultural 
symbols before physical and biological genocide takes place, the international community 
and organisations like UNESCO may have maintained hopes that a genocide was not 
occurring in Myanmar. When evidence provided by people in the refugee camps and the 
satellite images corroborated the destruction, it was too late. 
UNESCO is a global organization with limited power when it comes to stopping the 
destruction of cultural heritage—the case of Syrian conflict is perhaps the most notorious 
example (see Van der Auwera 2013, 2014; Cunliffe, Muhesen and Lostal 2016 and Meskell 
2018 for main reasons). The organisation’s limited capacity means that its efforts to fight 
extremism and genocide can only focus on a limited number of international crisis. However, 
crisis can be condemned in the media and global attention drawn to them. Media is a 
powerful ally of heritage protection since it provides much of the information regarding the 
specific aspects of the destruction of heritage. Likewise, it is in media that heritage 
destruction becomes a reality for most people, particularly for those outside the conflict zone. 
Media translates the destruction into an intelligible discourse that usually differentiates 
between the perpetrator and the victim. In recent years, UNESCO has adopted a strategy to 
fight extremism and cultural cleansing by producing “declarations, speeches … and a robust 
social media campaign” (Meskell 2018, 182). Meskell urges caution about such an approach, 
suggesting this tactic is both flawed and dangerous because it indicates “culture and 
education” can “promote peace”, by focusing on the monuments while disregarding the 
people in conflicts and crisis, thus “fetishizing the loss of things over life itself” (Meskell 
2018, 180). Indeed, speeches and declarations not only often backfire, particularly when they 
are expressed by international organisations such as UNESCO (see Isakhan and González 
Zarandona 2018), but they are also quite limited in scope if they condemn iconoclasm from 
below, while other actors perpetrate iconoclasm from above, as is the case in Myanmar. 
Fighting iconoclasm from below is the focus UNESCO’s Unite4Heritage campaign.
In the same way that heritage destruction in Myanmar requires an interpretation against the 
suppression of human rights and the deliberate intent to destroy the Rohingya, we must also 
interpret the heritage destruction against the broad geopolitics of heritage in Asia, and the 
heritage management of Rohingya heritage by the Myanmar state. While heritage is 
considered by experts as a process (Harvey 2001; Smith 2006), where particular parts of 
history are carefully selected and celebrated in official discourse, the management of heritage 
is a mandate which many countries puts in place to preserve and conserve certain elements of 
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history to pass them as heritage. A country rich in heritage sites brings more tourists and thus 
creates an industry that economically benefits the country, particularly when the country’s 
authorities succeed in inscribing a site into the UNESCO World Heritage List (Di Giovine 
2009). Regarding the heritage crisis in Myanmar, UNESCO has made, so far, no effort to 
address heritage destruction in Rakhine state, except for the race to inscribe the old city of 
Mrauk-U to the World Heritage List. The city has been on the tentative list since 1996. The 
city contains Buddhist monuments and it is located within Rakhine state. It was the seat of 
the powerful Arakan kingdom from 1430 to 1785. Early in 2018, the Italian and Myanmar 
governments signed a pact to safeguard, manage and improve the conditions of the old city – 
a common conservation practice that has seen a rise in heritage diplomacy conservation 
efforts in many heritage sites, particularly in Southeast Asia (Winter 2015). Perhaps the most 
ambitious of these is the Chinese economic initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) which seeks to assert Chinese cultural connection in different Asian and African 
locations by activating heritage sites located on historic trade routes, known as the Silk Road 
(Winter 2017). According to the Myanmar Times (2018), the Myanmar government “duly 
acknowledged the role that the preservation of Mrauk-U…may play in the sustainable 
development of the region, and committed to support the listing of Mrauk-U as a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site.” The site was scheduled to be nominated in 2017 but the violence in 
Rakhine state forced the nomination to be shut down (Hogan 2018). The safeguard pact 
should be seen as a response of the Myanmar government’s wishes to attract tourists to 
admire Buddhists temples in a conflict site, perhaps trying to replicate the successful tourism 
industry that has burgeoned in Cambodia around Angkor Wat, since it was inscribed into the 
World Heritage List in 1992 (Winter 2007). However, the pact may also be seen as a 
response to accelerate heritage conservation work in a post-conflict landscape that will agree 
with the Chinese partners who invested in the construction of a Chinese-controlled deep-
water port in Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State (Tiezzi 2016), as part of China’s BRI Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar corridor. It is then important to consider why UNESCO has not been 
involved in a place like Rakhine compared to the efforts in Syria or in other places of 
conflicts. Perhaps the answer is not in the historical disinterest of the West in Rakhine state, 
and the Rohingya’s fate, or the lack of classical monuments, Biblical or historical sites in 
Rakhine, or the limited funds that the organisation possesses. While these reasons may be 
sensible enough to account for UNESCO’s lack of interest in this crisis, the fact that 
Rohingya’s lands in Rakhine state have acquired a new value (Berthet 2018), due to China’s 
construction of the port, the building of international free-trade zones around it and even 
transnational gas and oil pipelines in Rakhine state (Forino, von Meding and Johnson 2017), 
may play a bigger role in the destruction of Rohingya’s heritage.
In terms of heritage, tourism and media, it is clear that Myanmar is now emerging from 
isolation since the new civilian government was installed in 2011, and what can it offer in 
terms of resources and tourism is much less compared to many other Southeast Asian tourism 
destinations. A contradiction is thus present in how Myanmar is embracing its inclusion into 
the international club, including China’s BRI, by sponsoring the listing of Buddhist sites to 
the UNESCO World Heritage register, supported by foreign governments and experts 
supervising the nomination dossier, and the listing of the Buddhist Pyu Ancient Cities 
(Beikthano, Halin, and Sri Ksetra) in 2014, while at the same time perpetrating heritage 
destruction that belongs to the Rohingya, suppressing their human rights and access to their 
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places of worship – an action that contravenes current UNESCO’s ideals of heritage as a tool 
to unite rather than divide (Meskell 2018, 198). 
In Myanmar, as in many other places where a conflict occurs, heritage is weaponised to 
create a strict division between different religious heritages, in this case Buddhist and non-
Buddhist heritage. Myanmar authorities have historically privileged Buddhist heritage over 
the heritage of other minorities present in the country (Philp 2010). Neglecting Rohingya 
heritage in Myanmar is thus not an uncommon strategy. However, destroying it is indeed 
extreme but, as we have shown, a tool as part of the Myanmar state to deliberate destroy the 
Rohingya. According to Philp (2010), the military junta that governed Myanmar for decades 
used the conservation efforts to restore Buddhist heritage to legitimize their position. For 
scholars like Logan (2007) and Morris (2015), the issue of privileging and using a certain 
type of heritage is entangled with human rights issues. The fact that Rohingya people were 
denied access to their places of worship by the Myanmar government is also an example of 
how their human rights were supressed together with the destruction of their heritage. As we 
have outlined above, it is difficult sometimes to know which iconoclasm comes from above 
and is thus, tolerated and encouraged, and which one comes from below and punished. The 
case of the destruction of Rohingya heritage presents a case study to not only better 
understand this phenomenon, but also how it is framed by the geopolitics of heritage which 
have an interest and a stake in protecting World Heritage, while neglecting unlisted heritage. 
Although several organisations have condemned the genocide against the Rohingya with 
various results, the destruction of their heritage has fallen, unfortunately, unto deaf ears. 
Condemning iconoclasm from above would be a first step towards the prevention of further 
destruction. By demanding that iconoclasm from above ceases and making it clear that it is as 
destructive as that of below, some prevention might be achieved. The case of Myanmar is a 
reminder that the destruction of cultural heritage during a conflict is a sign of further 
destruction to come. In the past, several case studies prove that in many instances is not 
always possible to prevent destruction by condemning it, but in other cases, efforts were 
successful in preventing further destruction of heritage thus allowing a recovery process. For 
example, during the Spanish Civil War, propaganda from both sides was created to stop the 
destruction of cultural heritage, appealing to all Spaniards to consider the effects of their 
actions before they would even think about destroying it (Barrios Rozúa 2008). The claim 
was based on the fact that regardless of who owned the heritage, it belonged to everybody, 
regardless of religious or ideological affiliations.
Conclusions
There is a lack of a nuanced analysis of the destruction of Rohingya heritage in Myanmar in 
media and academic literature today. Historically, the destruction of heritage has always been 
politicised and used by governments in order to sway the course of conflicts and war. 
Likewise, the destruction of heritage acts as a proxy way towards the extermination of 
particular groups, when governments and military forces aim to destroy a cultural minority or 
group. In the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar, we have demonstrated that the destruction of 
heritage can be characterized as iconoclasm of above, and iconoclasm from below. In this 
article we have mapped cultural heritage destruction in Myanmar, specifically in Rakhine 
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state and we have argued that much of this heritage destruction should be understood as a tool 
of the genocide being committed against the group by Myanmar’s authorities. We have 
acknowledged that while international bodies like UNESCO might have limited capacity to 
intervene to prevent heritage destruction, they are not completely powerless. Bodies like 
UNESCO, can for instance, bring heritage destruction to the attention of key decision makers 
and the global community. This point is acknowledged by UNESCO who have started the 
Unite4Heritage campaign to address the deliberate destruction of heritage by violent 
extremist groups (UNESCO 2018). However, in light of the evidence of heritage destruction 
in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, we suggest UNESCO extend this campaign to include 
addressing the deliberate destruction of heritage by state actors. 
Notes
1. In this article our aim is to maintain meaning and avoid confusion where names are 
concerned. We use the name “Myanmar” to refer to the country from the time its 
name was officially changed by the military junta in 1989. In referring to the 
country’s history prior to 1989, the name “Burma” is used. Where necessary, to 
preserve meaning and avoid confusion, both the former and official name will be used 
in tandem as “Burma/Myanmar”. 
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